VIENNA, 1934: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN.
"Methodological rules are here regarded as conventions. They might be described as the rules of the game of empirical science". This is one of the main statements in Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959, p. 53) . The theory of science developed there is basically a theory of the scientific method: it analyses what procedures in scientific research are right. Popper's basic idea was that this analysis can not be deduced from logic alone -as perhaps positivists and Cartesians might have tried behaviour of the players once the second game is in place. Though only the second step is what is ordinarily called 'a game', it is important to notice that both are equally susceptible of being described and studied as 'game-theoretic games'. An important consequence of the constitutional level of the game of science being describable in these terms is that the norms of science (or of a particular group or institution within science) must respond to the interests of those players or coalitions 'powerful enough' to determine what the norms are. This power, however, has usually very strong limits; for example, if less powerful scientists don't like the rules imposed by the élite, the former can often 'emigrate' to other scientific fields (or leave science); or, if the working of the imposed norms does not deliver products valuable enough from the point of view of those providing funds to that branch of science, these may put pressure on the élite to change the rules. Taking this into account, the rules of a branch of science can be seen as a kind of 'social contract' between, first, insider participants, who 'negotiate' amongst themselves what will be considered as 'appropriate' behaviour in the game of research, and second, between insiders and relevant outsiders, those that have some resources scientists need, and can decide to whom will those resources be given depending on what they are getting in exchange.
So, the question I want to ask in this paper is the following: instead of considering scientific rules and norms from the point of view of a detached epistemologist who is trying to design an 'ideal' science, and instead of taking them just as a brute social fact, we can think of the rules from the point of view of the people that will have to 'play' according to them, and ask whether we would be interested in having exactly those norms or others instead, and, not less importantly, what concessions would we be willing to make as regards our 'ideal' norms in order to reach an agreement with other colleagues that would prefer different rules. Of course, in order to ask these questions, we need some information about the interests or preferences of scientists. There have been very strong disputations between 'rationalist' authors (mainly, philosophers) claiming that the basic goals of science are of cognitive or epistemic nature, i.e., that scientists pursue fundamentally knowledge about the world (though different philosophical schools deeply disagree about what knowledge is and how it must be looked for) on the one hand, and, on the other hand, other authors, mainly social scientists, asserting that real scientists pursue lots of other goals, mainly 'social' goods, as power, prestige, income, or class interests. Though both visions of scientists' goals are usually presented as deeply incompatible, I think there is no need of doing it so; the incompatibility is due more to the contradictory theses about the rationality and validity of scientific knowledge those authors attempt to derive, than to the fact that the two kinds of goals are different; for it is obvious that there is absolutely no logical contradiction in one's having different goals, values or interests: this is just what continually forces us to having to make choices, and choices are what economic theory is all about. Hence, what we have to do is to acknowledge that scientists have both epistemic and non-epistemic interests and values within their 'utility functions' (and that both epistemic and non-epistemic preferences can have a variety of conflicting elements), and to study how the circumstances in which scientists have to make a decision determine how much of every one of those goals must be honoured or sacrificed, i.e., which is the optimum choice for them in each case. Stated differently:
the economic approach to these choices allows us to interpret the 'conflict' between epistemic and non-epistemic values not in terms of a contradiction, but in terms of a trade-off, i.e., in terms of how much of some goals is one willing to sacrifice in order to get a little bit more of another goal. So, the right view of the relation between the 'social interests' of scientists and the 'epistemic values' that philosophers would want be realised in the production of scientific knowledge, is not that the former are incompatible with the latter, but, in the worst case, that the former (the 'social' interests) are the price society has to 'pay' for having a certain amount of good knowledge, and, in the best case, that the former are an essential part of the social mechanism (in the sense of the 'market mechanism' 8 ) that leads researchers to behave in an epistemically sound way. Hence, the relevant connection between scientists' epistemic and nonepistemic interest can, hence, be formulated as the following question: by how much must we rise the level of satisfaction of scientists' non-epistemic goals in order to persuade them to improve by a certain amount the epistemic quality of the knowledge they produce?
We must also take into account that, by their very essence, rules are chosen to be more or less stable, i.e., they will be valid during a period that will include a lot of different decisions, and it is difficult for a scientist to forecast exactly how well will those norms affect the acceptability of the results and ideas defended by her in the future; so, the defence of a norm must not be based on mere short term interests. In order to give more content to this question, we need to specify a little bit more what are the kinds of rules that are pertinent for our discussion. I am not referring simply to the 'regularities' that can be observed in scientific practice, but only to those regularities that have, from the point of view of scientists, a normative content: they are principles (often implicit) that tell scientists what kind of 'behaviour' is appropriate and what is not, or that serve to determine the valuableness of a scientific output. In the next section I offer a classification of these types of norms, based on the comparison of the process 9 The presence of this type of interests is grounded on the literature on sociology of science, particularly in empirical works (e.g., Latour and Woolgar (1979) cannot be an epistemic utility, because utilities must be defined on statements that the agent is able of noticing whether they are true or false (they must be 'psychological' entities, so to say); so, I define instead the empirical verisimilitude of a theory as the similarity between the description of the world given by the theory and the description given by the known empirical facts, weighted by the informativeness of these facts. 15 As I shall comment in more detail in the next section, this definition has the virtue of explaining a much wider set of common methodological criteria than the other logical definitions of verisimilitude developed after the failure of Popper's one.
Lastly, our strategy also allows to understand in a new way the connection between a descriptive and a normative view of scientific methods; first, there is here a factual assumption: scientists take norms as normative constraints on their decisions, decisions that, however, will be based on the pursuit of some personal goals under those
constraints; investigating what these constraints are, and what effect they have on the 12 I'm using 'theory' in the sense of any scientific claim that starts being hypothetical. 13 See, for example, Zamora Bonilla (1996) , (1999), (2000) and (2002b). 14 Popper (1963), ch. 10. For a survey of research on this concept, see Niiniluoto (1998) . 15 
Formally, Sim(A,B) = p(A&B)/p/(AvB), Inf(A)= 1/p(A), and hence, Vs(H,E) = Sim(H,E)Inf(E) = p(H,E)/p(HvE).
An alternative, more complex definition is that the verisimilitude of H given E is the maximum value of Vs for H amongst all the possible subsets of empirical data contained in E.
outcomes of science, is a piece of 'positive' research. However, it is also possible to investigate the actual norms of science from a normative point of view: are they acceptable, or desirable, from the goals that 'we' (as philosophers, practicing scientists, or citizens) actually have?
A TAXONOMY OF SCIENTIFIC NORMS.
In order to describe science as a game, we have to make some choice about what we think the game 'is about'. As I have said, the pursuit of knowledge has been the main answer offered to this question from philosophy of science, but, if we want to honour the important competitive nature of research, we can say, instead, that the 'point' of the game is to get the recognition of having made an important discovery.
You not only want to gain knowledge, but you also strive for the world (which may The main role of the norms of internal inference is that of regulating what hypotheses, models, theories, and so on, will be accepted by the scientific community.
An old philosophers' dream was to reduce this type of norms to the bare rules of formal logic or mathematics, so that all scientific inference could be explained as algorithmic and apodictic inference. But, without denying that science makes abundant use of those types of inferential norms (in any piece of calculation or logical argumentation), it is clear that many of the conclusions that scientists derive are not so well grounded from a formal point of view, nor, when they are more or less uncertain (which is the fate of most of the cases), are they even expressed (or expressible) in the clean probabilistic terms that would allow the applicability of statistical calculus. But the absence of algorithmic rules to infer whether a scientific claim is true or false, or how probable it is, does not mean that scientists lack real criteria to determine whether the 'weight of evidence' is in favour 'enough' of a hypothesis, model, or theory. What happens is that these real criteria are tacit, and learned in a paradigmatic way (i.e, transmitted by means of examples); they constitute a practice to master, rather than a canon to be blindly applied (cf. Kitcher, 1993 ). This does not mean, as well, that these practices are analysable or can not be the object of conscious choice or explicit discussion (as a norms of this type; but note that what counts as 'simple', and the weight of predictions against explanations of known facts, varies a lot from field to field and time to time.
In the third level, once a certain amount of 'evidence' has been assembled, other norms must tell whether it is sufficient to allow a choice amongst the proposed hypotheses, or to discard some ones, or to force the acceptance of only one of them; or, contrarily, if it is still necessary to collect more evidence before a decision is taken.
Stated differently, the rules of the third level determine when is a theory or model so good that its acceptance becomes compulsory within a scientific community.
What can the game theoretic approach tell us about the rules that scientists would prefer for the second and third levels? 17 We must note that the definition of 'epistemic quality' is something so central in the scientific game, and so relevant to the possibility of transporting results from one field to other field, that it is reasonable to assume that it will be very stable. Researchers learn what is what defines the epistemic value of a theory much earlier than they become capable of proposing theories that can be subjected to their colleagues' judgment. So, these norms are 'constitutional', in the sense explained above: they must be chosen without taking into account to what cases they are going to be applied, or allowing as little interferences as possible from the desire of favouring specific theories. They must also be very stable in the sense that they are almost undisputed, for, more than other rules, they say what is the game scientist are playing, what is what they are 'producing'. Taking this into acount, the simplest assumption is that scientists will prefer to estabish those rules for defining the epistemic quality of the theories, that are coherent with the scientists' own 'epistemic utility function'. Hence, if this is utility can be represented by the concept of empirical verisimilitude we saw by the end of section 1, then there is a reason to expect that those norms for theory comparison that derive from the formal properties of that function are the norms that we will observe in actual scientists, which seems to be the case. Some of these norms are:
-between confirmed theories, those with more content are preferable;
-between theories explaining the same data, those with a higher probability are preferable;
-the more implausible a prediction of a theory is, the higher the increment in the value of the theory if the prediction is confirmed; 17 I assume that, at the first level, they simply prefer ordinary logical and mathematical rules, plus simple rules of induction.
preferable, if the theory has very low probability;
-if it is expected that new data are going to be found, only the existing data that confirm the hypotheses are taken into account to assess their epistemic value.
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The three first rules are consistent with Bayesianism; the first and second would be approved by Popper, but not the second one; the fourth is consistent with Kuhn's description of the judgment of rival paradigms (even radical empirical successes or anomalies don't force the defender of a paradigm to accept the rival one, if the principles of the other theory look incoherent), whereas the last rule has a Lakatosian flavour (at the beginning of a research program's development, only confirmations, and not falsitications, are taken into account).
Regarding the norms of the third level (those commanding to accept a theory when it is 'good enough'), the game theoretic approach leads us to consider the acceptance of a theory as the outcome of a competitive game: each scientists competes for being the 'winner', i.e., that having propose de accepted theory (or that having made the discovery). What the members of the scientific community have to decide in this case at the 'constitutional' level is a certain degree of verisimilitude such that the theories that passes that level will be accepted (some especial rules can be established for those cases when more than one passes). So, what these rule define is what is a discovery. The relevant question is, hence, if you were a scientist, what definition would you prefer? The strategy to answer this question consists in determining the expected utility a researcher would get for every possible definition (i.e., for every possible degree of verisimilitude that were taken as the 'discovery threshold'); this demands to know the probability of finding a successful theory surpassing that threshold (i.e, how 'difficult' is to solve a problem in the field), but we can assume that this probability is intuitively known by practicing scientists. The optimal definition of 'discovery' would simply be the one that maximises this expected utility. Given certain formal assumptions, it can be proved that the preferred level of epistemic quality would correspond at least to that level such that the probability a researcher has of making the discovery is inversely proportional to the average number of competitors.
It must be stressed that the fact that the norms in the second and third steps are conventional and subjected to choice by the scientific community, does not necessarily they think that all possible criteria are equally effective or ineffective in satisficing the goals of scientists, whatever these goals might be).
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Before leaving the first group of norms (of internal inference), I want to stress the fact that the game theoretic approach allows us to approach the so called 'problem of induction' in a very different way from how it is considered in other philosophical theories. In the typical exposition of the problem by Hume or Popper, it consisted in that no amount of confirmatory evidence can 'proof' (in the sense of logical proof) a general hypothesis; another formulation would say that, even assuming that a finite empirical evidence can give a positive degree of confirmation to a general hypothesis, the choice of a particular threshold of epistemic value such that theories surpassing it can be 'accepted' is completely arbitrary and has no rational foundation. According to the game theoretic approach, however, the first problem is 'solved' by taking as an empirical datum the fact that scientists prefer to play a game in which there are rules that allow to accept a theory on a finite corpus of data, instead of playing a game in which there are no 'discoveries' (but only 'unfalsified hypotheses'); so, what counts is not that inductive inference can logically prove scientific hypotheses, but that there is a set of inferential norms that are accepted by scientists and lead to the compulsory acceptance of some hypotheses. To the second problem, what we can say is that the choice of this threshold is seen as conventional, but not arbitrary, for it is the outcome of a rational choice that takes into account the preferences of the scientists; so, the 'solution' to the problem of induction comes from considering the utility scientists derive from playing an inductivist game instead of other possible games. Of course, what one must do in order to epistemically assess the rules allowing to do just that, is to consider what is the average epistemic value of the hypotheses that turn out to be the 'winners' in such a game.
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I pass now to discuss the other two groups of inferential norms. Rules of internal inference allow scientists to pass from some statements written in their 'books' to others, but there must exist some regulation of the processes by which some propositions enter into the game 'by the first time'. This is the role of the entry norms.
We can divide these into two kinds: norms telling that one must, or is allowed to, write a sentence in her book because the sentence is written in another scientist's book; I shall call these authority norms. The second kind consists in those rules telling what 'nonlinguistic' events license or force the introduction of a 'datum' into a scientific argumentation, and I shall call them evidence gathering norms. The first group of entry rules refer to 'entries' that are so just from the point of view of a single researcher, of course, but this does not mean that these rules are co-extensive to the ones discussed in the previous paragraphs; an obvious connection between authority norms and internal inference ones is that the former must be coherent with the latter: you can be obliged to accept the claim of another scientist only if this claim was also for her a commitment entailed by her arguments; but the reverse is not necessary at all: that someone is obliged by the rules of argumentation to conclude her argument with some proposition, does not force other scientists to accept also the same proposition, if they have not accepted the same premises (as a matter of fact, most of the claims made by real scientists in their papers are not accepted by their colleagues). Actually, it is possible to capture the difference between both types of rules by considering that internal inference norms are applicable in the context of the discussion between several researchers about what is the right solution to a problem, whereas authority rules apply when a solution has been determined, so that its acceptance becomes compulsory for all the other 21 Another situation that can be analysed with the help of game theory is when the inferential rules allow each scientists to accept one amongst several incompatible statements (if these have enough quality). It is possible that how interesting it is to accept one of these proposition depends, amongst other things, on how many colleagues accept each one. In this case, we can assume that the community will be in a Nash equilibrium, though it is possible to show that more than one equilibrium can exist. Cf. Zamora Bonilla (2007), 659-666. members of the community, i.e., even those not participating in the discussion; authority norms regulate, then, the communication channels going from the 'original' discovery to the average researcher, and, very importantly, to students (e.g., textbooks).
More important from an epistemic point of view are evidence gathering norms, for they are the ones that connect scientific claims with the real world. These norms are essential also from a game theoretic point of view, for, since the prize for a researcher is recognition, and this is often a competitive prize, in the sense that the recognition given to a scientists lowers the chances of other colleagues being recognized, then it might seem that the dominant strategy for every single researcher would be to systematically deny that a colleague has made a discovery; this might they do it not only by asking always for 'more' evidence (a strategy macroinferential norms attempt to stop), but by refusing to accept any confirmatory evidence, i.e., by not accepting the empirical premises necessary for the confirmatory arguments to function. So, scientist need, in their pursuit of recognition, that some clear cases exist where none of those taking part in a scientific discussion can discuss that certain data are so an so, or, at least, that the possible reasons to discuss this are clearly specified. This is again a deeply Popperian or what statistical level of significance is to be chosen, all these kinds of questions are subjected to the agreement of each scientific community, and reasons to agree on certain answers instead of others will be based on the same combination of epistemic and professional interests we have mentioned above. For example, there has been a lot of discussion about the limits of replicability in scientific experimentation, and on if this entailed that all empirical data are a mere 'construction' (cf., e.g., Collins, 1985) ; the answer suggested from the point of view of this paper is that real scientists would not demand something as strong as perfect replicability as a necessary basis for accepting an empirical claim: even if it were feasible, it would be as costly as unexciting; they surely prefer to agree on accepting an empirical claim if there are some variety of different experimental protocols that independently confirm that claim, what allows to give recognition to more researchers for more original work. This, however, leads to a greater probability of fraud, since a researcher, expecting that others will not replicate exactly her own experimental design, could simply opt for inventing her results. The game theoretic solution to this problem is to institute some rules that make the discovery of fraud more likely and the associated penalty discouraging enough, but the community can tolerate a certain frequency of misbehaviour, if the expected gain in epistemic and professional terms is high enough (cf. Zamora Bonilla (2006) , 346-49).
These rules can be different for different situations; for example, it is not the same case when one is trying to confirm an existing theory (and forges the data in order to make them agree with the theory), or when one is claiming a revolutionary discovery;
incentives to reproduce the results, and hence to certify whether fraud has existed or not, will be different in each case, and the 'prizes' given to those in charge of the reproduction, as well as the 'penalties' to the 'convicted', will have to vary accordingly.
I would suggest that the growing branch of game theory known as 'mechanism design' could be fruitfully applied to this kind of problems, investigating the properties of these type of rules, and establishing something like an 'economics of trust' in the empirical foundations of research.
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Discussion on 'prizes' and 'penalties' leads us finally to exit norms, those that command or license actions on the basis of the contents of each researcher's 'books'.
Since every action entails that certain amount of limited resources are devoted to some goals instead of others, these rules can be described as mechanisms for the resource allocation. Everything that is valuable for scientists and can be distributed amongst alternative aims counts as a resource: funds, positions, space for publication, time in meetings, grants, prizes, equipment, assistants, and so on. The role of the exit norms is to state what are the appropriate criteria for distributing these resources, including those that determine who can be taken as a member of the discipline. 23 The relevant question, again, is what rules of resource allocation would you prefer as a practicing scientist? For example, would you prefer those rules commanding to engage in selfcritical research (à la Popper), or wouldn't be better to let criticism to the 'rivals'?
22 Zamora Bonilla (2006b) applies this idea to the case of the choice of an interpretation for one's experimental or observational results: in this case, the situation is a game between the author of a scientific paper, who wants to make that interpretation that makes the discovery to be most important, and the readers, who want the conclusion to be as well empirically supported as possible, since this is what warrants its applicability. 23 I thank to a referee of this paper the suggestion to include the latter type of norm.
Would you prefer 'winner-takes-all' norms, giving a disproportionate amount of resources to the 'big stars', or some kind of 'insurance rules', that guarantee a decent chance of success for those not having the good luck of starting their careers in a top department? Would you prefer norms making it very difficult to publish, or more 'liberal' ones? Would you prefer peer review allocation mechanisms, or some other type?
My last observation is the following: along this section I have tended to adopt the perspective of the practicing scientist, on the assumption that the rules of each discipline are negotiated basically amongst its members, but it is also useful to consider the problem from a more general point of view, on the lines of the 'social contract' argument outlined in section 1. In the first place, we can also ask what of these norms would a 'common citizen' prefer, where she given the knowledge of the consequences each possible systems of norms will have: it is possible that they are not the same norms Regarding all this questions (which by no means are novel ones), I think that the capacity of game theory to analyse these mechanisms and negotiation processes is an epistemic resource that science studies can simply not dispense with.
